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Right Goals, Wrong Tools?
Civil Society Empowerment in the  
EU Accession Process
by Natasha Wunsch 
 
Summary  Civil society organizations (CSOs) have the potential to serve as im-
portant domestic agents of change. One of the European Commission’s declared 
aims for countries aspiring to join the European Union is the empowerment of civil 
society throughout the accession process. This was a lesson learned from the 
previous enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe, which was dominated 
by executive actors and saw only patchy implementation of adopted reforms. The 
Commission has sought to strengthen the involvement of CSOs in political pro-
cesses by building their internal capacities and fostering an enabling environment 
for their operation. Nonetheless, both empirical evidence and the very setup of 
the EU’s support suggest that the Commission struggles to move beyond a purely 
instrumental use of civil society empowerment. Croatia’s accession process illus-
trates the limitations of the Commission’s current approach. The recent addition of 
a more political dimension of civil society support is welcome, but further steps are 
needed to strengthen CSOs as active partners in the policy-making process. This 
paper concludes by proposing seven concrete steps that the Commission should 
take, from further strengthening the political dimension of civil society support and 
insisting on the involvement of CSOs in membership negotiating processes to sup-
porting ongoing CSO initiatives on the ground.
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Introduction
Countries aspiring to membership in the European Union 
are required to undergo thorough transformation as part 
of the accession process.1 Meeting all EU membership 
criteria has become more challenging than ever. Not only 
have EU standards evolved, but the gap between those 
standards and the current realities in candidate countries 
is also growing. Moreover, enthusiasm within the EU for 
enlargement is declining as the EU faces difficulties both 
on the economic front and in terms of uneven member 
state performance. Rather than countering member 
states’ “enlargement fatigue” with increased efforts to 
demonstrate their own readiness to enter the EU, candi-
date states have mirrored the EU’s disengagement with 
“reform fatigue.” For the countries of the Western Balkans, 
the accession process has been dragging on for over a 
decade.2 Moreover, the new president of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has declared that 
there will be an “enlargement pause” under his mandate. 
With no entry imminent, finding alternative ways to 
foster change is crucial. It is in this context that the EU’s 
support for civil society in accession countries merits 
closer examination.
Support for civil society has emerged as the corner-
stone of a more comprehensive approach to EU enlarge-
ment over the past decade. First mentioned in a com-
munication on Turkey in 2004,3 the Commission’s focus 
on developing civil society was extended to Croatia and 
the remaining Western Balkan countries the following 
year.4 The Enlargement Strategy of 2007–08 underlined 
the need “to strengthen civil society bodies and their 
role in the political process.”5 This push for civil society 
empowerment in the accession process reflects a more 
general desire inside the EU to make decision-making 
more transparent and to foster “participatory democracy” 
both within the EU and in its engagement with third 
countries.6 With civil society promotion a core element of 
the European Neighborhood Policy and the EU’s external 
relations, insights from the Western Balkans are relevant 
beyond the enlargement setup and can serve as a test 
case scenario for tools that might be deployed in other 
geographic areas.7
The need to enlarge the circle of actors involved in the 
accession process is a direct lesson of the enlargement 
rounds of 2004 and 2007, during which twelve mostly 
Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU. 
Despite being hailed as an historic reunification of Europe, 
the enlargement also left a bitter aftertaste: unfinished 
reforms and a modernization process driven essentially 
by elite executive actors.8 Both legislative and non-insti-
tutional actors remained marginalized, despite the fact 
that their participation had the potential to forge a deeper 
and more sustainable transformation of their respective 
countries. The disappointing performance of Bulgaria 
and Romania – and, even more worrying, the recent 
democratic backslide in Hungary – confirmed the need to 
rethink the nature of the accession process.
The Commission’s approach to civil society is still 
evolving. Croatia’s recent experience – as the first acces-
sion country to fall within the scope of the Commission’s 
more inclusive enlargement policy – offers a good occa-
sion to take stock of the achievements and shortcomings 
of the EU’s support for civil society in the enlargement 
context. How successful has the EU been so far in empow-
ering civil society throughout the accession process? And 
how can the EU ensure that its efforts to transform rela-
tions between domestic policy-makers and civil society 
actors are sustainable beyond the accession date?
This assessment is based on the analysis of documents 
relating to civil society published either in Brussels or 
by official and non-institutional actors in the accession 
countries. Empirical insights were also collected through 
fieldwork conducted in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, and 
Brussels between August 2013 and October 2014.9
The analysis addresses the two different levels of the EU’s 
support for civil society: the domestic level and the EU 
level. In the (potential) candidate countries themselves, 
EU policy has evolved from a focus on capacity building 
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into an increasingly political approach that seeks to shape 
the institutional environment of CSOs and improve state-
CSO relations. At the EU level, the Commission directly 
consults CSOs to gain insight into the situation on the 
ground and to offer a model of best practice to national 
governments. Still, the example of Croatia points to some 
important shortcomings in the EU’s approach, most nota-
bly when it comes to using the accession process strategi-
cally as a means of empowering civil society actors in the 
long term. The analysis concludes with concrete recom-
mendations for how to further improve EU support for 
civil society in accession countries.
1. Evolving Support for Civil Society at the  
Domestic Level
The EU’s policy of civil society support in the accession 
process started out as a reaction to the unsatisfactory 
results of purely executive-driven reforms, and has 
undergone a number of adjustments and refinements 
since its inception. The 2007 enlargement package made 
civil society development a key priority for EU accession, 
elevating improvements in this area to a political crite-
rion.10 After an initial focus on strengthening the internal 
capacities of CSOs, the European Commission began 
placing emphasis on improving the environment in which 
CSOs operate. Most recently, efforts to streamline support 
for civil society now tackle state-civil society relations as 
a crucial link between these two dimensions.
1.1 Capacity-building and technical support
In addition to recognizing civil society as a political crite-
ria for accession, the Commission’s 2007–08 Enlargement 
Strategy announced the launch of a specific Civil Society 
Facility to provide various forms of support. These includ-
ed capacity-building, exchange of experiences between 
EU-level organizations and CSOs, and direct project 
grants.11 A large portion of technical support is coordi-
nated through the TACSO project (Technical Assistance 
for Civil Society Organizations), which has offices in each 
of the capitals and acts as training hub and facilitator for 
establishing collaboration between CSOs from the region 
and member states. In terms of direct grants to CSOs, 44.5 
million euros were made available for regional and coun-
try projects in Turkey and the Western Balkans in 2014, 
and 24.65 million euros are slated for 2015.12 
One visible impact of the EU’s efforts has been the 
undeniable professionalization of the civil society sector 
throughout the region. A large number of organizations 
have begun to work on accession-related issues and to 
design projects that correspond to the key priorities iden-
tified by the EU for each candidate country. While this 
serves the Commission’s purpose of strengthening non-
state actors that are able to feed into its ongoing evalua-
tion of reform progress made on the ground, the strong 
involvement of the EU in civil society development brings 
with it a set of less desirable consequences.
To begin with, EU grants have become a major fund-
ing source for CSOs, especially as international donors 
increasingly withdraw from the Western Balkans region. 
This has led to a streamlining of organizations and a 
strategic orientation that mirrors the EU’s agenda more 
than it reflects domestic needs. Organizations often 
adapt their activities to the current priorities set by the 
EU, leading to sudden shifts in focus or to an overly broad 
scope of action that reduces the depth of expertise CSOs 
can bring to the table. The multiplication of organizations 
sharing a similar focus and approach within each country 
frequently leads to energy lost in bickering among organi-
zations – at the expense of creating constructive input for 
the reform process.13
In addition, the double function of the EU as the key 
donor and major reference point to back up CSOs’ policy 
recommendations also affects the positioning of these 
organizations within society. Contrary to the participa-
tory democracy model that sees CSOs as a link between 
a complex policy-making process and the average citizen, 
CSOs are becoming increasingly alienated from their 
original constituencies. Not only does the bureaucratic 
application procedure for EU-funded projects absorb a 
significant amount of human resources, but this situation 
is accentuated by the fact that the bulk of EU financial 
support is project-based. CSO staff must therefore juggle 
multiple projects simultaneously in order to ensure the 
organizations’ survival, and time-consuming fundrais-
ing activities leave little space for engagement with the 
broader population. The initial hope that CSOs could both 
inform citizens about progress in the accession process 
and feed their concerns into the policy-making process 
has been largely disappointed. Instead, CSOs active at the 
policy level are often perceived as a sort of parallel elite 
disconnected from the general population, which has 
raised questions regarding the legitimacy of any request 
formulated by them on behalf of a larger group.14
Overall, the EU’s approach to civil society is criticized 
as being overly driven by accession rather than geared 
toward the demands formulated on the ground. Both the 
strengthening of a small number of already well-estab-
lished organizations and the priorities defined through 
calls for applications and training offers correspond more 
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closely to the Commission’s immediate desire for civil so-
ciety accompany the membership negotiations. This can 
run counter to the more long-term objective of creating a 
sustainable civil society able to feed constructively into 
the general policy-making process at the national level. 
1.2 Creating an “enabling environment”
Creating an “enabling environment” for the work of CSOs 
is the second pillar of the Commission’s efforts to enhance 
civil society involvement, alongside directing technical 
and financial support to these organizations. The concept 
– understood as the existence of supporting institutions 
and formal provisions for consultations at the national 
level – has in recent years become a major focus of EU as-
sessments. Ensuring a favorable framework within which 
CSOs can evolve is the logical counterpart to enhancing 
their internal capacities.
The 2010–11 Enlargement Strategy first expressed 
the intent to tackle the formal interactions between the 
state and civil society, calling for “public consultation on 
policy initiatives and draft laws [to] become the general 
principle.”15 Civil society development and, most crucially, 
the dialogue between CSOs and state governments were 
thus recognized as a horizontal policy measure worthy 
of separate evaluation in the annual progress reports. 
Including this issue in the EU’s regular evaluations sent 
an important signal to governments that the Commission 
was interested in seeing improvements in the legal and 
institutional framework in which CSOs operate. 
On occasion, the EU has exerted direct political pres-
sure to foster advancements in this area. In the case of 
Montenegro, for example, the improvement of consulta-
tion mechanisms for civil society was one of the ten key 
priorities the country had to meet in order to open formal 
accession negotiations.16 Coming on top of significant 
domestic advocacy efforts in this area, the Commission’s 
statement was followed by the adoption of two important 
decrees detailing the government’s obligation to cooper-
ate with CSOs and spelling out the required consultation 
procedures for adopting all new laws, by-laws, and stra-
tegic documents. Similarly, the opening of the Serbian 
Governmental Office for Civil Society in 2011 was largely 
a result of the EU’s insistence that such a body be cre-
ated, and both the head of the EU Delegation and various 
member state ambassadors have repeatedly shielded its 
director against attempts to replace her by less committed 
persons closer to the governing party.17 Moreover, experts 
funded by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA) were the driving force behind the recently adopted 
guidelines for consultations with civil society in Serbia.18 
Despite these important advancements at the formal 
level, both previous accessions and the experience of civil 
society actors in the current candidate countries show 
that the introduction of formal procedures alone is gener-
ally not enough to change the practice of policy making. 
While consultations may be more frequent, they are still 
widely perceived as ornamental, with CSO input typically 
disregarded at the decision-making stage or even sought 
only once a document has been finalized.19 The EU’s in-
creasingly vocal political support for civil society should 
therefore include fostering a fruitful climate for including 
civil society that would allow such practice to become 
a constructive part of the policy-making process rather 
than a mere legal obligation.
1.3 Streamlining support for civil society: political 
culture as third pillar
The EU’s two most recent enlargement packages show 
efforts to streamline its policy toward civil society. In 
2013, the Commission’s strategy for the upcoming year 
mentioned for the first time that “a stronger role for civil 
society is key” when it comes to improving the democratic 
functioning of institutions.20 The latest enlargement pack-
age goes even further, introducing a unified approach to 
civil society across all accession countries. Each individu-
al country progress report therefore contains the sentence 
that “an empowered civil society is a crucial component 
of any democratic system and should be recognized and 
treated as such by the state institutions.”21 This statement 
acknowledges both the democratizing potential of includ-
ing civil society and establishes the need for a more proac-
tive approach by state institutions as a criterion for future 
assessments of candidate countries’ performance.
The new set of guidelines for the support of civil 
society in the 2014–20 period (adopted in October 2013) 
similarly emphasizes the role of civil society as “a crucial 
component for any democracy.”22 In addition to insisting 
on the two well-established dimensions of strengthening 
internal CSO capacities and creating a “conducive envi-
ronment,” the guidelines add changing relations between 
CSOs and governments as a third objective of civil society 
support in the enlargement context.23 A monitoring 
matrix spelling out concrete indicators of progress was 
included as an annex to the document. This confirms the 
Commission’s intention to make progress in the area of 
civil society more measurable in the future, enhancing its 
importance as one of the political criteria for accession.24
In formal terms, the guidelines provide a very useful 
framework for the EU’s support of civil society, spanning 
all three dimensions of civil society empowerment: 
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internal capacities, institutional framework, and 
improved state-civil society relations. At present, how-
ever, their non-binding character means that national 
governments are in no way compelled to adhere to them. 
Rhetorical pressure is therefore the only means by which 
the EU can push governments to fulfill the objectives. 
This reduces the likely effectiveness of the guidelines, 
especially when it comes to the key element of improv-
ing the political culture that underlies relations between 
state-level actors and non-institutional players seeking to 
provide input into the policy-making process. 
Here the EU can provide a model to national govern-
ments on how to effectively associate CSOs through 
consultative procedures that are mutually beneficial for 
both those actors formally in charge of decision-making 
and outside players seeking to provide input into such 
processes.
2. Consultations at the EU Level: Between 
Empowerment and Instrumentalization
Parallel to its efforts to foster changes for CSOs at the 
domestic level, the EU has deepened its own engagement 
with civil society actors. In previous accession rounds, 
bilateral interactions between the EU and the candidate 
state governments tended to dominate the negotiation 
process. The result was frequently a one-sided picture 
of government compliance; the EU had few means of 
checking the extent to which adopted legislation was 
implemented on the ground. In the Western Balkans, the 
EU has consistently sought to involve CSOs as sources of 
information for its regular assessments of the situation in 
(potential) candidate countries. 
Initially established on an ad hoc basis, CSO consulta-
tions have since become a regular part of the EU’s efforts 
to evaluate progress in the different candidate countries. 
They involve both the EU Delegations on the ground and 
the Directorate General (DG) in Brussels. Beyond provid-
ing the EU with insights from within the countries, how-
ever, the Commission’s consultations with CSOs also send 
a message to national governments: it is absolutely crucial 
to involve civil society actors. To serve this purpose ef-
fectively, however, the Commission’s current consultation 
procedures require important adjustments.
2.1 Deepening EU engagement with CSOs in  
accession countries
EU consultations with CSOs already began tentatively in 
2006, when the Commission started seeking their input 
on specific issues. Originally launched in Brussels, the 
consultation process has become increasingly formalized 
and has been moved down from the DG Enlargement 
level to the level of the EU Delegations. The elaboration 
of the annual progress reports now foresees CSO input at 
different moments throughout the year, with open calls 
for comments on various areas defined by the Commis-
sion. An initial round of CSO input is sought in early 
spring by the Delegations, which formulate a first draft of 
the progress report. A limited number of CSOs – typically 
one per country, addressing a topic set by the Commis-
sion – are then invited to Brussels in June to elucidate 
their positions. Evidence-based assessments are strongly 
encouraged, as is language that reflects the Commission’s 
own formulations.
Interestingly, this consultation cycle was formalized 
less as the result of a strategic decision on the part of the 
Commission than in response to demands from regional 
civil society actors, who wanted to be heard in Brussels. 
The Open Society Foundations (OSF) were particularly 
vocal in calling for more established procedures, both 
through their Brussels office and their local branches 
in the region. To this day, given the limited funding for 
CSOs to visit Brussels, the OSF covers the expenses of 
several CSO representatives travelling to Brussels for the 
June consultations. 
In addition to the formal cycle of consultations, EU 
Delegations on the ground maintain regular contacts 
with CSOs in their respective countries to discuss specific 
issues throughout the year. Several of the stronger CSOs 
additionally keep in touch with desk officers in Brus-
sels, frequently sending them input on current topics 
and sharing both success stories and particular concerns 
with them. CSOs generally tend to be satisfied with the 
accessibility of both the EU Delegations and the country 
units in DG Enlargement, even though there is a general 
feeling that the Commission assessments, when they are 
eventually published, tend to be more positive than CSO 
impressions warrant.
On the whole, the Commission’s principle of leading 
by example has merit. Still, the EU’s current approach re-
mains overly instrumental in that CSOs are used first and 
foremost as sources of information rather than as part-
ners, as they would be in an approach that truly reflects 
the participatory democracy model. The Commission sets 
the priorities, with limited space for CSOs to bring their 
own concerns to the table. For EU-level consultations to 
serve as a fully valid model for national governments, the 
partnership dimension of the exchange needs stronger 
emphasis.
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2.2 Establishing CSOs as partners: Improving feed-
back structures
The consultation process at the EU level offers CSOs a cru-
cial opportunity to seek EU backing for their claims, and 
CSOs throughout the Western Balkans are increasingly 
aware of the added leverage that EU support offers them. 
Nevertheless, feedback from the EU on CSO input is often 
lacking. Moreover, the setup of the consultations is mere-
ly bilateral rather than including government officials 
from accession countries. Both of these factors limit the 
ability of such consultations to serve as examples of civil 
society inclusion in domestic policy-making processes.
Providing feedback on CSO comments is a vital way for 
the EU to show that it values their efforts. In both Croatia 
and Montenegro, such a feedback loop is foreseen in the 
national regulations on consultations, with the desired 
effect of forcing state officials to listen to CSO input rather 
than ignoring it from the start. CSOs often lament that 
national ministries have only limited respect for this pro-
vision, though a call for feedback is explicitly contained 
in the Commission’s guidelines on civil society support.25 
Nonetheless, there is no equivalent provision for the EU’s 
own consultation procedures. While the Commission 
has lately introduced a general debriefing session for 
non-governmental actors following the publication of the 
annual progress reports, this gathering does not offer the 
opportunity for in-depth discussion of CSO remarks and 
the way they were used in producing the Commission’s 
final assessment.
Despite the additional work it involves, such in-depth 
engagement is worthwhile on two counts. First, CSOs 
have a powerful incentive to offer substantial, well-
argued recommendations – instead of submitting purely 
subjective viewpoints – if they can expect greater recep-
tiveness. Second, given the Commission’s insistence that 
national governments carry out effective consultations 
with CSOs, showing a high standard of responsiveness at 
the EU level sets an important example.
As for the formal setup of the Commission’s consulta-
tion process, its engagement with civil society is currently 
limited to bilateral encounters between EU and CSO 
representatives. This format initially helped establish 
good working relations between these two sets of actors. 
The exclusion of state-level actors, however, forces the EU 
to go back and forth between state and CSO sources in 
order to establish its own position on certain contentious 
issues. Involving both state-level and CSO representatives 
in trilateral meetings would allow for more immediate 
exchanges, with the EU serving as a potential mediator. 
It would signal to state actors that the consultation of a 
wider circle of interested parties is a normal part of policy 
making. The need to articulate their criticism in construc-
tive, applicable recommendations will likely improve 
the image of CSOs (who are still widely seen as anti-
government agitators) and serve to develop more fruitful 
state-CSO relations. Finally, creating a routine of direct 
state-CSO interaction – interaction that goes beyond the 
pro forma involvement of civil society representatives in 
legal working groups – would be a first step toward en-
couraging that the practice continues once the accession 
negotiations have been concluded.
On the whole, the EU’s consultation process offers a 
valuable opportunity for CSOs to channel their demands 
through EU actors, thereby benefiting from the additional 
pressure of conditionality in order to convince state-
level authorities to act in certain areas. Still, including 
feedback on CSO input and facilitating direct state-CSO 
interactions would greatly improve the current process. 
Sharpening the Commission’s consultation approach 
would be an important step toward using the full trans-
formative potential of the accession process to foster civil 
society empowerment.
3. Using the Accession Process to Empower 
Civil Society
The evolving support to civil society in the enlargement 
countries as well as the Commission’s own increasingly 
systematic engagement with CSOs from candidate states 
suggest that the EU’s commitment to civil society em-
powerment is more than a fashion or a rhetorical exercise. 
However, close scrutiny of civil society development in 
Croatia both during and after that country’s accession 
holds important lessons on how lasting civil society em-
powerment can be achieved.
3.1 Lessons learned from Croatia
Croatia is the obvious reference point, as it is the first 
member state from the Western Balkans to successfully 
complete membership negotiations under the Commis-
sion’s more inclusive approach toward accession negotia-
tions. Two contradictory elements emerge. On the one 
hand, Croatia’s advanced institutional setup and progres-
sive civil society policy now serve as a model for many of 
the remaining candidates from the region. On the other 
hand, disappointing developments in the civil society 
sector since Croatia’s accession in 2013 partly call into 
question the EU’s ability to foster participatory democracy 
after EU accession – and to some extent even cast doubt 
upon its credibility.
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The Croatian case stands out for the early introduc-
tion of institutions enabling CSOs and for ongoing efforts 
to improve the institutional and legal framework under 
which CSOs operate. The same sort of triangular struc-
tures supporting CSOs in Croatia are, moreover, now 
emerging as the institutional template for the rest of the 
region. The Croatian Government Office for NGOs was 
opened in 1998 – long before the EU became interested 
in civil society empowerment in accession countries. 
The National Foundation for Civil Society Development, 
which disburses funding from national sources, was 
established in 2003, while the Council for Civil Society, an 
advisory body, was created in 2009.
Despite this favorable institutional environment, the 
degree of transparency and inclusiveness in the accession 
negotiations was largely unsatisfactory.26 Civil society 
mobilization occurred rather late in the negotiation 
process, with CSOs essentially reacting to the imminent 
closure of chapter 23 of membership negotiation (Judi-
ciary and Fundamental Rights) and what they felt was 
inadequate progress in the area of rule of law. A number 
of CSOs joined together to form a monitoring coalition to 
put together shadow reports addressing Croatia’s fulfill-
ment of the criteria spelled out in this chapter, pointing 
to crucial gaps that needed to be addressed before formal 
membership talks were closed.27 While critical voices in 
Croatia informed some of the final exchanges between 
the EU and state-level actors,28 CSOs nevertheless failed 
to see their most important recommendation honored: 
the introduction of an internal post-accession monitoring 
mechanism to prevent any backsliding on reforms.29
The dynamics at play in the Croatian case neatly show 
the temporal dimension of civil society empowerment 
through EU accession. Essentially, once the 2013 accession 
date was set (in June 2011), the EU’s interest in obtaining 
critical CSO input evaporated. While the Commission 
and EU member state embassies in Zagreb gladly used 
information provided by CSOs during the ongoing nego-
tiations, the imminent shift from Croatia’s asymmetrical 
status as candidate state to full EU member caused the 
Commission to withdraw to a large extent. Member states, 
too, became reluctant to point their finger at a future peer. 
As a result, CSOs lost their once-powerful ally against 
reform-shy state-level actors.30
Acknowledging the new setup, the CSO monitoring 
coalition shifted its advocacy efforts from EU-level to 
state-level actors. In the run-up to the legislative elections 
in December 2011, the coalition (which had meanwhile 
grown to include over seventy organizations) changed its 
name to Platform 112. Together, its members challenged 
all parties running for election to commit to address 112 
remaining shortcomings that they had identified. Two 
reports on the new government’s performance followed, 
but despite significant media coverage, Platform 112 had 
largely run its course. Since then, the coalition has once 
again shifted its focus – away from interaction with politi-
cal actors toward citizens – engaging in more narrow 
campaigns as it attempts to find its place in the post-ac-
cession political landscape.31 However, in addition to time 
constraints of member organizations, the withdrawal of 
many international donors, and the transfer of funding 
disbursal from the EU toward decentralized structures 
in the member states have left even some of the strongest 
drivers of Platform 112 struggling for financial survival 
and therefore less able to feed constructively into the 
policy-making process.32
The post-accession difficulties faced by Croatian CSOs 
shed light on a crucial weakness in the EU’s approach 
to civil society. While significant political and financial 
investment in empowering civil society may yield results 
during the accession process, these advances remain 
strongly linked to the EU’s presence and financial support 
and therefore lack sustainability. To compensate for this 
inevitable structural constraint, the EU needs to use the 
limited duration of the accession process all the more 
strategically to set the course for durable changes. EU 
grants cannot continue indefinitely; associating CSOs 
with efforts to diversify funding sources is crucial to shap-
ing their awareness of this fact. Financial sustainability is 
a core condition for the continued independent operation 
of CSOs after accession. It needs to be a priority both with 
governments and CSOs in the lead-up to the completion 
of membership talks.
3.2 Drawing civil society into accession 
negotiations
Part of the EU’s support for civil society consists of peri-
odically reiterating the importance of associating CSOs in 
the accession process. Indeed, the impact that the open-
ing of membership negotiations has in terms of reshaping 
national administrations presents a prime opportunity to 
establish civil society inclusion as a model to be imitated 
in other policy settings. Regrettably, the EU’s demand 
that civil society be included in the negotiations is often 
purely rhetorical. The Commission generally justifies this 
by noting its reluctance to impose a certain mechanism 
upon candidate countries, given the variety of models of 
state-civil society relations among EU member states. As 
in other areas requiring institutional adjustments, howev-
er, it seems that an objective evaluation of the mechanism 
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chosen by the national government would not constitute 
undue interference on the part of the Commission.
The disappointing experience of Croatia’s civil society 
in the accession process has already provided CSOs in 
other countries with an important lesson. They are aware 
of the importance of mobilizing early and pushing for an 
official recognition of their role. In Montenegro, for ex-
ample, CSO representatives succeeded in being formally 
included in governmental negotiating groups. Points of 
contention nonetheless remain. These include incomplete 
access to documents and a general disregard for the input 
of CSOs – although the government put forward formal 
CSO involvement as a sign of its intense cooperation with 
CSOs. Given the ambiguous Montenegrin experience, 
Serbian CSOs privilege hybrid and extra-institutional 
forms of mobilization. Recently they launched a so-called 
national convent composed of CSOs in cooperation with 
Serbia’s National Assembly, whose EU committee has 
agreed to wait for the convent’s input before pronouncing 
itself on accession-related issues. Finally, the Croatian 
CSOs involved in Platform 112 widely shared their experi-
ence with their counterparts in neighboring countries, 
including the elaborate methodology used for its shadow 
reports and the formal setup as a coalition. Similar initia-
tives are now underway throughout the region.33
Whereas the Commission regularly praises such inno-
vative forms of inclusion, it could go further, particularly 
in recognizing initiatives that include actors from other 
sectors, such as legislative or judicial ones. Moreover, an 
open expression of support for CSO monitoring coali-
tions by the Commission would further demonstrate 
the importance the EU attaches to effective civil society 
involvement. Fostering close and productive cooperation 
between state and CSO actors throughout the negotia-
tions can inspire state and non-state actors to perceive the 
eventual closure of membership talks as a joint success. 
This in turn sets the stage for further instances of con-
structive cooperation.
Conclusion: Toward Effective Empowerment 
of Civil Society 
The EU’s support for civil society has had the merit of 
raising awareness within candidate states’ governments 
of the importance of drawing the civil sector into the 
substantial reform requirements of the accession process. 
The policy’s unusual sensitivity to input from beneficia-
ries on the ground has allowed it to evolve substantially, 
both in terms of the areas tackled and the depth with 
which developments are evaluated.
The EU’s support for CSOs extends the dynamic of 
the accession process beyond the traditional EU-state 
dyad. This change benefits the accession process, help-
ing strong and capable CSOs compensate for the current 
lack of interest within the EU in enlargement. Faced 
with widespread corruption and weak state capacities 
at home, CSOs’ role as watchdogs is crucial to holding 
governments accountable and contributing to the lasting 
democratization of the Western Balkans region. Moreover, 
EU support for CSOs also has implications beyond the 
accession context. In the long run, effective civil soci-
ety empowerment and improved state-CSO relations in 
candidate countries will enrich the EU itself. The Union 
will ultimately benefit from new member states whose 
policies are discussed by a broad range of actors and 
supported by greater expertise than would be the case for 
mere executive-driven policy-making.
Obviously, improving the EU’s policy of empowering 
civil society is only one side of the triangle. It cannot trig-
ger fundamental change in state-civil society relations 
on its own. Not only must national governments demon-
strate clear political will to include CSOs in the policy-
making process, but domestic CSOs must also start think-
ing beyond the next project cycle about how to develop a 
funding model that ensures their financial sustainability 
(for the EU, like other international donors, will not be 
funding their projects indefinitely). In the meantime, the 
Commission can facilitate these processes by living up to 
its own commitment to fostering civil society throughout 
– and beyond – the accession process.
The following recommendations are intended to serve as 
guidelines for a further refinement of the EU’s policy:
1. Strengthen the political dimension of civil society 
support in addition to focusing on capacity-building 
and fostering an enabling environment. Improving 
state-CSO relations beyond the institutional frame-
work is crucial to ensuring an empowerment of CSOs 
that lasts beyond the accession date.
2. Require candidate state governments to adopt EU-
level guidelines on civil society support (which are 
at present not compulsory). This would ensure states’ 
clear commitment to meeting the objectives outlined 
in the guidelines. The alignment of national strate-
gies for civil society development with the EU’s gui-
delines and progress toward meeting the objectives 
should be regularly assessed, and any shortcomings 
should be raised in direct meetings with responsible 
state actors.
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3. Improve EU-level consultations with CSOs by adding 
a systematic feedback element. This would place clear 
value on CSO input and encourage evidence-based 
comments over anecdotal criticism. The EU should 
provide its feedback at all stages in which CSOs are ac-
tively associated in the evaluation process, i.e. it should 
be provided both by desk officers in Brussels and by EU 
delegation staff on the ground.
4. Establish a routine of trilateral meetings involving 
the Commission, state officials, and CSOs. This would 
foster a culture of exchange and demonstrate the 
Commission’s esteem for civil society actors. Such 
meetings should be held on specific sectoral topics 
and should bring together relevant state-level actors 
with CSOs engaged in the questions at hand. The EU 
delegations can help identify relevant CSOs, thereby 
preventing the state from engaging in overly selective 
practices.
5. Insist upon CSO involvement in the membership nego-
tiation process. This requirement should be made early 
on, with candidate countries free to choose the model 
of inclusion they consider most adapted.
6. Make the accession process as open and transparent 
as possible. This includes making relevant documents 
available to CSOs and enabling their participation in 
all stages of the screening process – ideally in person, 
but at the very least through a two-way video link that 
allows CSOs to directly address participants of the 
screening process in Brussels. 
7. Recognize and support civil society initiatives on the 
ground, particularly where these include a variety of 
organizations or go beyond the civil society sector to 
include representatives of parliament, the judiciary, or 
the media.
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